

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 202 777

SO 013 397

AUTHOR Nelson, Dale C.
TITLE Hispanic Political Attitudes: A Comparison of Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans.
PUB DATE Aug 80
NOTE 40p.; Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, DC, August 28-31, 1980). Not available from EDRS in paper copy due to poor reproducibility of original documents. Some pages may not reproduce clearly from EDRS in microfiche due to variations in ink density.

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Bureaucracy; *Cubans; *Dominicans; Ethnicity; *Hispanic Americans; *Political Attitudes; *Puerto Ricans; Social Science Research

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the political attitudes of Hispanic groups, particularly the Cubans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans in New York City. The data for paper come from a 1973 Ethnic Block Survey of 466 residents of the Washington Heights Inwood section of Manhattan. Interviews were conducted. Three kinds of attitudes which predispose people to take political action were studied: civic attitudes, ethnic consciousness, and bureaucratic attitudes. Findings include the following. Regarding civic attitudes, the Puerto Ricans exhibited the highest levels of psychological involvement in politics. Initial findings appeared to uncover higher levels of both cynicism and community awareness among Puerto Ricans. However, when length of New York City residence was held constant, differences between Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics all but disappeared on these variables. The Puerto Ricans exhibited the highest levels of ethnic political consciousness. The Dominicans expressed higher levels of ethnic political consciousness than Cubans. The examination of bureaucratic political attitudes showed few if any differences in bureaucratic attitudes among Hispanic groups. A further comparison of Hispanics with blacks and whites did little to identify a distinctive Hispanic bureaucratic pattern. On six of the eight bureaucratic attitudes, Hispanics proved to be little differentiated from blacks and white ethnics. The more general purpose of the study was to evaluate the utility of the concept of "hispanic political behavior" as a description of a set of political attitudes. With few exceptions, the term "hispanic political attitudes" was of little conceptual help in describing the attitudes analyzed. The paper also briefly examines some political and historical features of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. (Author/RM)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

ED202777

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Dale C. Nelson

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

HISPANIC POLITICAL ATTITUDES: A Comparison
of Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans

Dale C. Nelson

Fordham University

50 013 397

Prepared for delivery at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Washington Hilton Hotel, August 28-31, 1980. Copyright by The American Political Science Association.

INTRODUCTION

For most people the term "hispanic" refers to those who share a common language (Spanish), colonial heritage and culture. Hispanic peoples residing in the continental United States can, for the most part, trace their origins to the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America, and the Caribbean. As the 1980 Census will indicate, hispanics constitute a large and growing segment of American society. Some are even predicting that hispanics will outnumber American blacks by the end of the current decade.

Because hispanics make up such a significant proportion of the American population, one might expect to find a large literature on the social, cultural, economic and political life of hispanic peoples. But this is not the case. The paucity of political studies is particularly striking. With the possible exception of Chicanos, very little has been written about the role of hispanics in the American political process. And with few exceptions, studies of hispanic politics have focused on political leadership and political organizations. Studies of mass political behavior among hispanics are exceedingly rare, and to my knowledge not a single comparative examination of hispanic mass political behavior is currently in print.

In the present paper I seek to partially redress the imbalance in comparative hispanic political studies by examining mass political behavior among Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. Using survey data from a 1973 study of New York City ethnic groups, I will examine selected political attitudes of hispanics. Although the survey does contain a number of questions which tap other dimensions of political behavior (e.g., political participation, bureaucratic contacting), space

limitations prevent a full exploration of these dimensions of behavior at this time. However, it is hoped that the present paper will be a first step in the exploration of broader issues surrounding hispanic political behavior.

The comparative nature of this study is useful as a means of exploring a variety of research questions about hispanic political behavior. When the goal of research is theory-building on hispanic political behavior, as is the case with the present study, comparison is essential.

Studies of single ethnic groups run the risk of overemphasizing behavior that is common among other ethnic groups, or overlooking features which distinguish the political behavior of the single ethnic group. My goal, then, is to uncover regularities in political behavior or dissimilar behaviors among hispanic ethnic groups, specifically among Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans.

The central question of my research may be stated as follows: Can the term "hispanic political behavior" be meaningfully applied to a common core of political attitudes among Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans? In the case where the attitudes of Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans are indistinguishable, are they also distinctive when compared to the political attitudes of non-hispanic ethnic groups, e.g., white ethnics and blacks? Before presenting data germane to these questions, I will first specify the attitudes to be analyzed and the reasons for their selection. Next, I will briefly examine some politico-historical features of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, as well as aspects of the migratory experience, as a prelude to stating my anticipated findings. After stating my expected findings, I will discuss how key concepts of the study will be measured, the nature of the research site, and sampling information.

Conceptualizing Political Attitudes

For heuristic purposes, mass political behavior can be divided into two interrelated components: 1.) political attitudes--including opinions, beliefs, values and norms, and 2.) concrete political activity (e.g., voting). Many analysts of political behavior claim that certain attitudes are causally related to political activity--i.e., that they predispose people to be active or inactive, or that they lead to particular forms of political activity (e.g., rioting). It is in this sense that we can say that the two components of political behavior are interrelated.

Among the myriad of attitudes that might be chosen for analysis, I have selected several attitudes for which previous research has indicated a strong connection to political participation. I have also chosen other attitudes that one might reasonably expect to correlate with political activity, but these attitudes have not been analyzed in previous research efforts. There are two reasons for selecting political attitudes which predispose people to take political action. One is simply the need to deal with a limited number of attitudes in a paper of this length. More importantly, however, the analysis of such attitudes allows for future investigation of participation patterns among hispanics, as well as a comparative analysis of the links between attitudes and participation.

Three kinds of attitudes will be examined. The first I will call civic political attitudes. Much previous research has demonstrated that these attitudes are highly correlated with political participation. They include ^{level of} psychological involvement in politics, sense of political efficacy, level of civic awareness and knowledge, and political cynicism. Each of the civic political attitudes will be examined separately, and an overall civic index will be constructed to summarize hispanic attitudinal patterns.

A second kind of political attitude to be explored in this paper are attitudes which express strong or weak levels of ethnic political consciousness. Many studies have demonstrated that people who identify strongly with their ethnic group have a propensity to act politically when they perceive either a threat to their group's interests or an opportunity to promote those interests. The belief that one should take political or even militant action for one's ethnic group, that local government discriminates ethnically in terms of treatment or jobs, that government jobs should be distributed on an ethnic quota basis, ^{and} that government officials should give preferential treatment to members of their own ethnic groups are all attitudes **that will be examined** in this paper.

The third kind of attitude I will label bureaucratic political attitudes. These include a variety of attitudes that tap people's self-orientation as bureaucratic actors, and their evaluation of government agencies and officials. One attitude **reflects** the individual's propensity to seek government assistance for personal or family problems. A second set of attitudes is focused on the individual's self-orientation--specifically on the individual's emotions before contacting a government office and on how the individual would deal with bureaucratic officials. A third set of attitudes **expresses** evaluations of government agencies and officials. It includes the perceived likelihood of receiving help and personal treatment (including the value placed on personal treatment versus efficiency in a government office), and the expectation of receiving fair and equal treatment from government officials.

Taken as a whole, bureaucratic political attitudes are viewed as sources of bureaucratic participation, i.e., as attitudes which may **predispose** individuals to contact government bureaucratic agencies for personal (particularized) assistance.

Common threads unite the three types of attitudes to be examined. As indicated, all are potential sources of political activity. But we can also view these attitudes as a partial measure of political culture, i.e., as basic values and beliefs that guide a people's political behavior. Thus, the wide scope of attitudes included in this study may provide the basis for broader generalizations about the political culture(s) of Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans residing in the continental United States.

Historical and Migratory
Background: A Comparison

Beyond the fact that members of the three ethnic groups share a common language, there is strong reason to believe that Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans also share what can be labelled a common political culture. Cuba, Hispaniola (the island occupied jointly by Santo Domingo and Haiti) and Puerto Rico are all Caribbean islands conquered and settled by Spain in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. All are multi-racial societies sparsely settled until approximately the 19th century, when the islands attracted new settlers for agricultural production, primarily of sugarcane. Prior to the 19th century, Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico mainly served the strategic function of guarding Spanish galleons en route to and from the New World. This meant military-bureaucratic rule with little room for local grass roots political participation for three to four centuries of Spanish rule. Thus, the three societies shared similar social, economic and political histories at least until the mid-19th century.

By the beginning of the 19th century, however, the three societies began to diverge. Cuba clearly outdistanced its two insular neighbors in its level of economic development, and continued to do so well into the 20th century. Rapid economic development brought a concomitant diversification of economic and social sectors, spawning the rise of a strong indigenous commercial and professional elite which led the fight for independence from Spain in the late 19th century. Puerto Rico,

smaller and less well endowed with natural resources than Cuba, experienced a slower economic growth rate and a smaller, less diverse indigenous socio-economic elite. Torn by civil strife throughout much of its post independence period, the Dominican Republic experienced only limited ^{economic} growth in the 19th century. The infamous Latin American triad--latifundistas (large landowners), the military, and a strong, conservative Catholic Church--dominated Dominican politics and society well into the 20th century.

The 20th century brought major changes to the three societies, but each in its own way lived in the shadow and sphere of influence of the United States. Puerto Rico transferred colonial rulers from Spain to the United States after the Spanish American War, and it remains an American colony to this date. Cuba became an American "protectorate" for a brief period, but gained its political independence the century's first decade. in ^ The Dominican Republic, although ~~not~~ directly ~~ruled~~ by the United States, nevertheless has been subjected to strong American political, economic and military pressures throughout the 20th century.

There have been major similarities and differences in the political histories of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico in the 20th century. Cuba witnessed unstable national governments until the 1930's; thereafter, there was limited mass involvement in politics until the late 1940's, when Fulgencio Battista became head of a military dictatorship that was terminated by the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Since the revolution, mass political participation (some would call it political mobilization) has been extensive.

The early 20th century brought alternating periods of popular and military rule to the Dominican Republic, but the thirty-year reign of dictator Rafael Trujillo from the 1930's to the 1960's put an end to mass participation and a free-working political party system. For a period of about 18 months Dominicans experienced free elections and mass participation in the early 1960's, but a military coup and American military intervention in 1965 brought conservative elements back to

power, and ushered in a period which might be termed "controlled" mass participation.

The rise of the Partido Revolucionario Democrática (PRD) in the 1930's heralded the beginnings of mass-based parties and mass^{political} involvement in Puerto Rico. Since the late 1940's party identification levels have been high, and voting rates among the highest in the world. Political parties, however, have organized primarily around the issue of the future status of Puerto Rico (independence, continued Commonwealth status, and statehood). The unresolved status issue has tended to blur social **class** distinctions between political parties and placed other socio-economic issues in the background of electoral politics.

Among the three societies in the 20th century, Puerto Rico is unique in the type and rate of its economic growth. While Cuban and Dominican economies continued to be based on sugarcane production, Puerto Rico began a shift to industrial production in the late 1940's. Operation Bootstrap coaxed massive amounts of American industrial capital into Puerto Rico with the promise of tax holidays and other incentives. Urbanization has increased dramatically. Industrialization and a large tourist industry have created a significant tertiary (service) sector in urban Puerto Rico. Although many of the "benefits" of industrialization have not "trickled down" to the mass level, few would deny that industrialization has^{transformed} and will continue to vastly transform the social and economic structure of Puerto Rico.

The experiences of Cuban, Dominican and Puerto Rican immigrants are also relevant to our search for regularities in hispanic political behavior. All three immigrant groups are relatively recent arrivals. The establishment of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans in 1917 eliminated any legal restrictions on migration, but migration was small until the late 1940's, when job prospects in New York and inexpensive airfares attracted large numbers of migrants. The peak of Puerto

Rican migration was reached in the 1950's and early 1960's; since then migration has dropped off considerably. Cubans began to arrive en force after 1960. Contrary to popular images, Cubans from a wide variety of social and economic backgrounds and political inclinations have migrated to the United States, and it is not at all clear that their predominant motivation was political. Cubans have the special legal status of political exile or refugee, which means that they are essentially permanent residents of the United States unless or until they opt for American citizenship.

Dominican migratory **experiences are in sharp** contrast to those of Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Dominicans do not have the special legal status of either Puerto Ricans (citizenship) or Cubans (political exiles). Perhaps as many as 75 percent are illegal residents of the United States. Substantial numbers of Dominicans began their migration **to the United States (mostly to the New York Metropolitan Area)** in the mid-1960's, along with smaller numbers of hispanic peoples from other Central and South American countries. Like Puerto Ricans, Dominicans appear to be primarily motivated by economic opportunities in the United States, and there is evidence that many intend to return to the Dominican Republic after achieving their desired financial gains.

It is difficult to **accurately estimate the numbers of Cuban, Dominican and Puerto Rican migrants residing in New York City.** The Bureau of the Census has been roundly criticized for undercounting hispanics in New York and elsewhere. It is perhaps fair to say that of the 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 hispanics living in New York City in the mid 1970's, 1,000,000 to 1,250,000 were Puerto Ricans, 200,000 to 500,000 were Dominicans, and 200,000 to 300,000 were Cubans.

This brief foray into historical and migratory patterns, while far from a comprehensive comparison of Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, nevertheless is suggestive of possible similarities and differences we might expect to find in the political behavior of the three ethnic groups. In the section that follows, I

will state my expected findings on attitudinal similarities and differences, basing such expectations primarily on the historical and migratory patterns described above.

Anticipated Findings

Given the absence of previous research and theory, I will forego formal hypotheses in favor of general statements of expected findings. As a broad generalization, I anticipate some rather large differences in political attitudes between the three hispanic groups. **My thesis is that**, in general, the term "hispanic political attitudes" is not a very useful concept for understanding Cuban, Dominican and Puerto Rican attitudes. Therefore, I expect to uncover more differences than similarities in political attitudes. Specifically, I anticipate strongest differences in attitudes tapping levels of ethnic political consciousness, significant but perhaps less extensive differences in civic political attitudes, and smaller and perhaps insignificant differences in bureaucratic attitudes.

My expectation of ^{finding} a major attitudinal differences between hispanic groups rests on the belief that Puerto Ricans will clearly exhibit distinctive political attitudes vis-a-vis both Cubans and Dominicans. Such expectations are not based on the fact that Puerto Ricans are more **assimilated** than Cubans and Dominicans, however. In a previous study I discovered that the more assimilated Puerto Ricans are neither more nor less likely to exhibit attitudes conducive to political participation than the less assimilated Puerto Ricans. Rather, the reasons for Puerto Rican attitudinal distinctiveness **are, I think, rooted** in the politico-historical experiences Puerto Ricans bring with them to New York, and in certain aspects of Puerto Rican life in New York City.

Attitudes reflecting ethnic political consciousness are a case in point. Puerto Rico is unique among the three societies in remaining a colonial society throughout

the entire 20th century. The political reality of American domination could hardly go unnoticed by the majority of Puerto Ricans. For three to four decades the United States retained close political control over Puerto Rico, allowing representative politics to exist only in a colonial legislature, where leaders of small, **elite-**based parties negotiated with American-appointed governors for political benefits. Although **there** is no evidence that a majority of Puerto Ricans favor independence from the United States, independentistas have long been a significant force in Puerto Rican politics, and their activities (at home and abroad) have highlighted the fact that much political and economic power lies outside of Puerto Rico. Thus, it seems likely that the Puerto Rican migrant arrives in New York with a fairly strong level of ethnic identity, including a sense of ethnic political consciousness.

The Puerto Rican migrant to New York City in the late 1940's and 1950's encountered an ethnically-segmented society and social discrimination that was more direct and intense than in Puerto Rico where, after all, the overwhelming majority of residents are Puerto Rican. **But it was during** the 1960's that mainland Puerto Rican ethnic consciousness was politically galvanized. The Civil Rights Movement, the War on Poverty, ghetto riots and other events had a major effect on the ethnic political consciousness of Puerto Ricans as well as blacks, Chicanos and American Indians. The existence of a small but **visible** political leadership, and political organizations, aided in emphasizing the political distinctiveness of Puerto Ricans. Cubans and Dominicans were **new arrivals** in the 1960's, and there is little evidence to suggest that they actively participated in the Civil Rights Movement or other consciousness-raising events of the 1960's and 1970's. As yet, there have been no Cuban or Dominican equivalents to the Young Lords, Aspira, the Puerto Rican Forum, etc., and Cuban and Dominican leaders have received little or no media coverage. It appears probable, then, that Puerto Ricans will evidence greater levels of ethnic political consciousness than either Cubans or Dominicans in our study.

That Puerto Ricans will exhibit **civic political** attitudes more conducive to political participation than Cubans and Dominicans is, again, not the result of greater assimilation of Puerto Ricans to mainland Anglo society. Rather, I believe that the higher civic orientations of Puerto Ricans are grounded in political experiences in Puerto Rico. Granted, mass political involvement has been historically limited in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. However, there is little doubt that the participatory experiences of Puerto Ricans have been more extensive. Two interrelated factors probably reinforce the psychological involvement of Puerto Ricans in politics: widespread movement between Puerto Rico and New York, and the intense interest Puerto Ricans retain for island politics.

While I expect a distinguishable Puerto Rican pattern in civic political attitudes, I do not anticipate differences of the same magnitude as those for ethnic political consciousness. Several of the civic attitudes to be examined are local-specific, i.e., **they express political** awareness and knowledge of the New York City context. If my argument regarding the insular base of Puerto Rican civic attitudes is correct, general psychological involvement in politics should be highest among Puerto Ricans. I would also anticipate higher levels of political cynicism, due to the likely correlation between cynicism and ethnic political consciousness. However, attitudes expressing levels of

community political awareness should not differ greatly along ethnic lines. Finally, I have no specific expectations about attitudes measuring a sense of personal political efficacy.

It is among bureaucratic political attitudes that I expect few or no differences between the three hispanic groups. My reasoning is based on common hispanic experiences in New York, as well as on common historical patterns in the sending societies. First, research has demonstrated that lower social class status is

not necessarily an impediment to contacting government agencies. Therefore, socio-economic differences between the three hispanic groups should not lead to different levels of experience with government agencies. Secondly, Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans have all dealt with highly politicized government bureaucracies in their homelands. In New York, city agencies are run mainly by Anglos in an ethnically-charged environment where ethnic groups compete for bureaucratic services. Thus, I would expect members of all three hispanic groups ^{to} question the ethnic neutrality of city agencies, and to doubt that they would receive fair and equal treatment at the hands of government officials.

To summarize, then, I anticipate major attitudinal differences between Puerto Ricans, on the one hand, and Cubans and Dominicans on the other. I hypothesize that such differences will manifest themselves in levels of ethnic political consciousness and civic political attitudes, but not in bureaucratic political attitudes. I have no specific expectations regarding differences that may be uncovered between Cubans and Dominicans.

Data Base and Sampling Methods

The data for this paper come from the Ethnic Block Survey, a 1973 survey of 466 residents of the Washington Heights-Inwood section of Manhattan. It is one of several surveys conducted by the New York City Neighborhood Project at the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University between 1972 and 1974, and the entire project was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

Washington Heights-Inwood is a "neighborhood" of approximately 200,000 residents occupying the entire northern part of Manhattan. It is bounded on the south by 155th Street, on the north by the Harlem River, on the east by the Harlem and East rivers, and on the west by the Hudson River. As a study site, Washington Heights-Inwood is nearly ideal for the purposes of the present study. Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans occupy about one-third of the households in the

neighborhood; Jews and Irish account for another one-third of the households, and American blacks for approximately one-tenth. Washington Heights-Inwood is an ethnic microcosm of the city, reflecting very well the ethnic diversity of New York. Of all major ethnic groups, only Italian-Americans are poorly represented in the neighborhood. Washington Heights-Inwood is a rather typical New York City neighborhood in other **non-ethnic ways as well**. Its family income level is about average for the city as a whole, as are its various indicators of crime rates.

The major goal of the Ethnic Block Survey directors was to compare the political behavior of hispanics, white ethnics and American blacks. They wished to determine whether and in what ways ethnicity affected political attitudes and participation patterns of individuals. Census data indicated that white ethnics exhibited much higher socioeconomic status (SES) levels than either hispanics or blacks in the city's population. **Various** types of random samples were therefore rejected in the sample design process. It was feared that random sampling would produce so few white ethnic working-class and hispanic and black middle-class respondents, that ethnicity and SES could not be independently evaluated as sources of political behavior. Instead, an elaborate procedure was devised and residential blocks carefully selected to highlight ethnic differences and minimize SES and other social demographic characteristics of respondents. Once the blocks were selected, a combined **quota and** random sampling procedure was employed at the block level.

Although the research design process did not work perfectly in relation to the goals of the study, it was reasonably successful. Approximately equal numbers of Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, blacks, Jews and Irish were interviewed. There were substantial SES differences between white ethnics and other ethnics in the study, but enough variation within ethnic groups to examine the potentially separate impacts of SES and **ethnicity**.

DATA

Each of the three types of attitudes--ethnic consciousness, civic attitudes, and bureaucratic attitudes--will be examined separately. For each attitude type I will undertake four separate steps of analysis. First, I will describe the operational measures (survey questions) used to represent key attitudinal concepts. Second, I will present statistical tables which report mean attitude scores for each hispanic group. Etas will also be reported as a measure of correlation between ethnicity and the various political attitudes. T-tests will be performed to determine the statistical significance of "difference-in-mean" scores between the three hispanic groups, and the level of statistical significance will be reported in the tables.

Where major differences are uncovered between hispanic groups in step # 2, control variables will be introduced in the third step to determine whether such differences are "real", i.e., a function of ethnic group differences, or "spurious", i.e., solely the result of non-ethnic differences between hispanic groups. In the fourth step, variables for which there is little or no difference between hispanic groups will be entered into the analysis. Respondents will be grouped into three ethnic categories: hispanic, white ethnic and black. Differences in mean scores will be examined for these three ethnic categories, with etas and t-test results reported. If there are statistically significant differences in the mean scores of hispanics, compared to white ethnics and blacks, I will conclude that the attitudes in question represent distinctive hispanic patterns.

Ethnic Political Consciousness

We can define "ethnic political consciousness" as individual identification with the perceived political goals, interests and problems of the ethnic group. Six variables will be used to represent ethnic political consciousness. The first three reflect the "positive" side of political consciousness, i.e., identification with

the perceived goals and interests of one's ethnic group: 1)POLACTION--respondent's reaction (from strongly agree to strongly disagree) to the statement: "(Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans) should take political action to help other (Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans)"; 2)MLTNTACTION--respondent's reaction (from strongly agree to strongly disagree) to the statement: "Sometimes it is necessary for (Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans) to use militant tactics to fight for the things (Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans) need."; and 3)JOBQUOTA--respondent's reaction (from strongly agree to strongly disagree) to the statement: "If (Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans) are twenty-five per cent of the city population, they should get twenty-five per cent of the jobs in city government; no more, no less."

The next three variables reflect the "negative" side of political consciousness, i.e., identification with the perceived political problems of one's ethnic group: 4)ETHOFFCLS--respondent's reaction (from strongly agree to strongly disagree) to the statement: "If a (Cuban, Dominican, Puerto Rican) went to a city office with a problem, he would get better treatment there from a (Cuban, Dominican, Puerto Rican) than from the other people in that office."; 5)TREATDSCRM--respondents were asked the following series of questions: "Would you say that some groups are treated differently from others by the city government, or would you say that all groups are treated about the same?" (If some groups treated differently) "Which groups get better treatment?" "Which groups are not treated as well as others?" Respondents identifying their own ethnic group as getting worse treatment were coded "1"; all others were coded "0"; 6)JOBDSCRM--respondents were asked the following series of questions: "Are any groups getting more or less than their fair share of jobs in city government?" (If yes) "Which groups get more than their fair share of jobs?" "Which groups get less than their fair share of jobs?" Respondents identifying their own ethnic groups as receiving less than their fair share of jobs were coded "1"; all others were coded "0".

Table 1A presents data on the variables used to measure ethnic political consciousness. For each variable, a **mean (average)** score is reported for Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. Etas measuring the overall correlation between ethnic identity and ethnic consciousness variables^A are reported, and the **statistical** significance level of F-tests performed for each eta is indicated by asterisks. The statistical significance of **T-tests** is reported for each variable and each ethnic pair.

TABLE 1A. Levels of Ethnic Political Consciousness:
Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans
(N=189)

Variable (min/max)	$\bar{X}$ Scores			Eta	T-Tests-sig. levels		
	Cub (78)	Dom (61)	PR (50)		Cub/Dom	Cub/PR	Dom/PR
POLACTION (1/5)	3.91	3.97	4.40	.17	n.s.	.05	n.s.
MLTNTACTION (1/5)	2.58	3.15	2.54	.18	.05	n.s.	.05
JOBQUOTA (1/5)	3.10	3.33	3.58	.14	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
ETHOFFCLS (1/5)	3.05	3.46	3.76	.21*	n.s.	.01	n.s.
TREATDSCRM (0/1)	.14	.33	.54	.35***	.01	.001	.05
JOBDS CRM (0/1)	.17	.33	.48	.28**	.05	.001	n.s.

*Significant at the .05 level

**Significant at the .01 level

***Significant at the .001 level

The data in Table 1A tend to confirm our expectation that Puerto Ricans will exhibit the highest levels of ethnic political consciousness among the three hispanic groups. It is only on one variable (MLTNTACTION) that this is not the case. The results for "ethnic political militancy" are indeed surprising; based on

experiences in the 1960's, one would expect Puerto Ricans (and not Dominicans) to express the strongest positive association with militant action.

If the data tend to support my earlier predictions, they clearly do not support them to the degree that I anticipated. T-test results indicate that on only six of the twelve comparisons between Puerto Ricans and the other two hispanic groups are the mean differences statistically significant. On one variable (JOBQUOTA) there are no statistically significant differences in mean scores between any groups, suggesting the possibility that support for ethnic quotas for government jobs is more a measure of class consciousness than ethnic consciousness.

It is also interesting to note that the strongest differences between Puerto Ricans and the other groups show up on negatively-oriented items (especially on TREATDSCRM and JOBDS CRM). Also, with the exception of MLTNTACTION, it is on negative variables that Cubans and Dominicans can best be differentiated, one from another. Cubans exhibit the lowest levels of ethnic political consciousness on negative items, Dominicans a middle level of consciousness, and Puerto Ricans the highest level of consciousness.

Are the differences in ethnic political consciousness "real", i.e., the result of ethnic factors, or do other non-ethnic factors produce variations between Puerto Ricans, Cubans and Dominicans? To answer this question, control variables were introduced into the analysis. One such variable is socioeconomic status (SES). It is a composite index of educational level, family income before taxes, and occupational prestige level (based on the National Opinion Research Center's prestige scale). Puerto Ricans in the sample exhibit higher SES levels, on the average, than either Cubans or Dominicans. Thus, the higher SES levels of Puerto Ricans may also account for their greater ethnic political consciousness. Length of New York City residence is another control variable used in the analysis. Again, on the average, Puerto Ricans have lived in New York longer than Cubans and Dominicans. It is possible

that longer residence leads to greater ethnic consciousness, and that high political consciousness among Puerto Ricans is simply a function of their longer residence.

Age and sex were also introduced into the analysis as control variables. Cubans in the sample tend to be older and also lower in levels of ethnic political consciousness than either Puerto Ricans or Dominicans. If youth is associated with high ethnic consciousness, low levels of political consciousness among Cubans may be simply the result of age differentials between Cubans and the other hispanic groups. Females were oversampled among Dominicans (75.4%) and to a lesser extent among Cubans (64.1%). Given the possibility that hispanic men are more likely to become involved in politics, once sex is controlled differences in ethnic political consciousness between hispanic groups may be minimal or non-existent.

To evaluate the impact of the above-mentioned control variables, I introduced them as covariates into the ANOVA-based Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA). The dependent variables are the five consciousness items. The independent variable is simply the ethnic background of the respondent. Table 1B reports the results of the MCA analysis. For convenience, the unadjusted mean scores for each attitude and hispanic group are reported first. Mean scores adjusted for the impact of covariates (control variables) are also reported, along with the original correlation (η) between ethnicity and each attitude, and betas (i.e., the correlation between ethnicity and consciousness attitudes when the covariates are held constant):

TABLE 1B. Multiple Classification Analysis: Levels of Ethnic Political Consciousness by Ethnicity, Controlling for SES, Length of New York City Residence, Age and Sex (N=189)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Unadjusted $\bar{X}$ Scores</u>			<u>Adjusted $\bar{X}$ Scores</u>				
	<u>Cub</u>	<u>Dom</u>	<u>PR</u>	<u>Cub</u>	<u>Dom</u>	<u>PR</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Beta</u>
POLACTION	3.91	3.97	4.40	3.84	3.99	4.48	.17	.21
MLTNTACTION	2.58	3.15	2.54	2.57	3.12	2.59	.18	.16
ETHOFFCLS	3.05	3.46	3.76	3.03	3.36	3.91	.21	.25
TREATDSCRM	.14	.33	.54	.13	.38	.51	.35	.34
JOBDSCRM	.17	.33	.48	.18	.40	.41	.28	.23

The findings in Table 1B strongly suggest that differences in levels of ethnic political consciousness between hispanic groups are real. With the exception of JOBDSCRM, differences in mean scores between hispanic groups do not diminish with the introduction of control variables. In two cases (MLTNTACTION and ETHOFFCLS) mean differences actually increase. For JOBDSCRM, the effects of length of New York City residence were contaminated with ethnicity, so I performed a commonality analysis to sort out the unique and common impacts of the two independent variables. Ethnicity proved to be by far the strongest independent variable; it uniquely explained 4.7% of the variance in JOBDSCRM (compared to 1.5% for length of residence). When ethnicity was introduced first in stepwise regression, it explained 7.7% of the variance (compared to 4.7% for length of residence). I would conclude that differences between hispanic groups in their perceptions of government job discrimination are not simply the result of longer residency in New York among Puerto Ricans.

Our remaining task in this section of the paper is to examine further the variable JOBQUOTA (i.e., the belief that ethnics should receive government jobs

based on their proportion of the city's population). It will be recalled that, for this variable, no statistically significant differences in mean scores between hispanic groups were uncovered. Our purpose here is to determine whether hispanics exhibit a distinctive attitude on ethnic job quotas vis-a-vis white ethnics and blacks. Thus, a new ethnic variable was constructed. Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans **were recoded** into a single category we will label "hispanic." Jewish and Irish respondents were coded together as "white ethnics." The mean scores are as follows: for hispanics, 2.30; for blacks, 2.20; and for white ethnics, 1.29. Difference-in-means tests (T-tests) for each pair of ethnic categories, and the statistical significance of mean differences, ^{were} determined. The results are as follows: hispanic vs. black, n.s.; hispanic vs. white ethnic, $p > .001$; black vs. white ethnic, $p > .001$.

The results clearly indicate that hispanics are substantially different from white ethnics in their views on ethnic job quotas for government. However, the fact that hispanics and blacks are virtually indistinguishable on the issue leads me to suspect that the variable is simply a "smokescreen" for class consciousness. I used analysis of variance and MCA to determine whether JOBQUOTA was influenced solely by social class factors. The results indicated that both SES and ethnicity had independent effects. Thus, class differences did not account for ethnic differences, and we can conclude that hispanic views on job quotas in government are at least partially distinct--clearly different from white ethnics, but virtually indistinguishable from black americans.

To summarize our findings to date: we have discovered that Puerto Ricans generally exhibit higher levels of ethnic political consciousness than either Cubans or Dominicans. Puerto Ricans are most likely to express strong support for ethnic political action, to believe that government officials would give preferential treatment to members of their own ethnic group, and to believe that

local government discriminates against their ethnic group in treatment and jobs. None of the three hispanic groups was distinctive on the issue of support for ethnic job quotas in city government. While hispanics are much more likely to support job quotas than white ethnics, hispanics and blacks were about equal in their support of quotas. Dominicans are considerably more likely than either Cubans or Puerto Ricans to support the notion of taking militant action in defense of group interests. Finally, although I did not anticipate differences in levels of ethnic political consciousness between Cubans and Dominicans, on three of the six measures of consciousness (i.e., MLTNTACTION, TREATDSCRM, and JOBDSCRM), Dominicans demonstrated higher levels of ethnic political consciousness than Cubans, and differences between Cubans and Dominicans were statistically significant. Puerto Ricans, then, exhibit the highest levels of ethnic political consciousness, Cubans the lowest level, and Dominicans tend to fall somewhere in between.

Civic Political Attitudes

We can define "civic political attitudes" as attitudes which predispose people to participate in politics. Much previous research has demonstrated a close connection between political participation and one's psychological involvement in politics, sense of political efficacy, and level of civic awareness. (As indicated earlier, I am adding "political cynicism" to this list based on results of previous published research on the data set being analyzed in this paper.). Variables used to measure these concepts are, for the most part, composite indexes. Only sense of political efficacy is measured by a single variable. I will describe below how each index was constructed, and the single question used to measure efficacy.

Psychological Involvement in Politics (PINVOLVE) is a composite index of three questions: a) "Some people don't pay much attention to politics. How about

you? Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not interested at all?"; b) "And now what about national politics. Do you talk about national political questions with people you know well--often, sometimes, rarely, or never?"; and c) "How about the local issues in New York City? Would you say that you understand them very well, pretty well, not too well, or not at all?"

Community Civic Awareness (CVCAWARE) is an additive index of four questions: "In (Washington Heights/Inwood) how effective would you say local organizations are in dealing with neighborhood problems?"; b) "Is there a local newspaper that covers news about your area? What is the name of the paper?"; c) "Have you heard or read anything about the Neighborhood Action Program for this part of the city? Can you remember anything they have been doing?"; and d) "Are there any places, or groups, or particular people in this neighborhood who help people deal with city offices and services? What are their names?" Respondents were given one point for each correct answer (i.e., being able to evaluate the effectiveness of neighborhood organizations, knowing the name of a neighborhood newspaper, naming a valid activity of the Neighborhood Action Program, and being able to name a place or an organization that helps people deal with city government). The resultant index ranges from 0 to 4.

Sense of Political Efficacy (PEFFICACY) is a simple variable based on the following question: "Suppose a law were being considered by the New York City government that you considered unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do?" Respondents who said they could do something were coded "1"; those who said they could "do nothing" were coded "0".

Political Cynicism (PCYNICISM) is a composite index of answers to three questions: a) "How much do you think you can trust the government in New York City to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, some of the time,

or almost never?"; b) "Would you say that the government in New York is pretty much run for the benefit of a few big interests or that it is run for the benefit of all people?"; and c) "How about New York City government officials--do you feel they generally do their jobs well or don't they--just your impression?"

Index of Civic Political Attitudes (CPATTS)-- is an index of the above four attitude items. The variables were first standardized and then added together to form the index. It has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Table 2A presents data on the variables used to measure civic political attitudes. As was the case for ethnic political consciousness variables, mean (average) scores are reported for each hispanic group, etas to measure the correlation between the attitudes and ethnic identity, and t-tests to determine the statistical significance of mean differences:

TABLE 2A. Civic Political Attitudes: Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans (N=189)

Variable (min/max)	<u>X Scores</u>				<u>T-Tests-sig. levels</u>		
	<u>Cub</u>	<u>Dom</u>	<u>PR</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Cub/Dom</u>	<u>Cub/PR</u>	<u>Dom/PR</u>
PINVOLVE ¹ (-4.04/4.91)	-.81	-1.89	.10	.32***	.01	.05	.001
CVCAWARE (2/4)	.81	.69	1.12	.22*	n.s.	.05	.01
PEFFICACY (0/1)	.51	.30	.60	.25**	.01	n.s.	.01
PCYNICISM ¹ (-4.0/3.26)	-1.13	-1.11	.53	.30**	n.s.	.001	.001
CPATTS ¹ (-6.87/6.27)	-1.90	-2.88	-.32	.35***	.05	.01	.001

¹Standardized composite variable with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for the entire study sample

*p>.05; **p>.01; ***p>.001

The data in Table 2A tend to support my earlier contention that Puerto Ricans would express the strongest adherence to civic political attitudes. Uniformly, across all civic attitudes and the combined index of civic attitudes, Puerto Ricans exhibit the strongest predisposition to participate actively in politics among the three hispanic groups. Puerto Ricans are much more likely to be psychologically involved in politics and to express cynical attitudes about local government. We noted earlier, in our discussion of ethnic political consciousness, that Puerto Ricans were distinctive in their belief that city government discriminates against them in terms of treatment and government jobs. This ethnic perception of local government probably "carries over" to their beliefs about the general trustworthiness of local government. If Puerto Ricans express doubts about the ethnic neutrality of local government, it stands to reason that they would also believe that government favors "big interests" and cannot always be trusted to "do what is right."

Puerto Ricans also express greater levels of personal political efficacy than Cubans, and especially Dominicans, although mean differences between Cubans and Puerto Ricans are not statistically significant. Dominicans and Cubans^{also} show lower levels of community civic awareness than Puerto Ricans. However, a glance at the mean differences and t-tests for the four items making up the civic awareness index reveals an interesting finding: mean differences between Puerto Ricans and the other hispanic groups are not statistically significant on any of the four items. It is only on the cumulative index of civic awareness that mean differences are statistically significant.

Table 2A also reveals some interesting similarities and differences between Dominicans and Cubans. They do not differ statistically in levels of community civic awareness or political cynicism, but Cubans are more psychologically involved in politics than Dominicans, and they exhibit a higher sense of political efficacy. We can speculate that the special legal status of Cubans may account for their

differences with Dominicans. A greater percentage of Cubans than Dominicans have become U.S. citizens (34.6% compared to 18.0% for Dominicans) in the study sample. For Cubans to become American citizens means giving up the dream of returning to their homeland, so that investment in American citizenship may indicate a psychological re-orientation to American society and politics. The illegal status of many Dominican migrants may lead to lower levels of personal political efficacy, i.e., to the belief that Dominicans do not have the same political rights as many other New York residents. One Dominican in the sample expressed this sentiment quite succinctly when he said: "It is enough that we Dominicans are tolerated."

The findings on Puerto Rican civic political attitudes beg further analysis. Are higher levels of civic attitudes conducive to participation the result of the Puerto Rican island background, or are they merely a function of greater assimilation to mainland society? Do higher SES levels among Puerto Ricans in the sample lead to greater psychological involvement in politics? Are age and sex differences in the sample producing civic attitude differences between Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and Cubans?

To answer these questions, length of New York City residence, SES, sex and age were introduced as covariates in Multiple Classification Analysis. Table 2B reports the results of the analysis. Civic attitudes are the dependent variables and ethnic background is the independent variable. Once again, unadjusted and adjusted mean scores are presented along with etas and betas, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the effects of control variables:

TABLE 2B. Multiple Classification Analysis: Civic Political Attitudes by Ethnicity, Controlling for SES, Length of Residence, Age and Sex (N=189)

Attitude	Unadjusted $\bar{X}$ Scores			Adjusted $\bar{X}$ Scores				
	Cub	Dom	PR	Cub	Dom	PR	Eta	Beta
PINVOLVE	- .81	-1.89	.10	- .89	-1.39	- .49	.32	.16
CVCAWARE	.81	.69	1.12	.82	.81	.94	.22	.07
PEFFICACY	.51	.30	.60	.49	.37	.55	.25	.14
PCYNICISM	-1.13	-1.11	.53	- .76	- .73	- .54	.30	.04
CPATTS	-1.90	-2.88	- .32	-1.80	-2.20	-1.31	.35	.12

The results reported in Table 2B show a major impact of the control variables on the relationship between ethnicity and civic political attitudes among hispanic groups. The effects are particularly high for CVCAWARE and PCYNICISM, suggesting the possibility that ethnicity is spuriously related to these two attitudes. For the relationship between ethnicity and PINVOLVE, PEFFICACY and CPATTS, control variables reduce the zero-order relationships (i.e., eta versus beta), but they do not eliminate such relationships. It is therefore necessary for us to determine why and in what ways control variables influence the results of the data analysis.

The first step is to isolate the impacts of individual control variables. This is done by introducing each covariate separately for the relationship between ethnicity and civic attitudes. Proceeding in this manner, both age and sex were found to have negligible effects on ethnicity's relationship to civic attitudes; they were therefore dropped from the analysis. Length of New York City residence and, to a lesser extent, SES proved to be the confounding influences. A stepwise regression technique (commonality analysis) was used in an attempt to sort out the unique and common variances explained for civic political attitudes by ethnicity, SES and length of New York City residence.

The results of the commonality analysis for SES versus ethnicity were unambiguous. For all attitudes except PCYNICISM, SES proved to be the better predictor of civic attitudes. However, with the possible exception of CVCAWARE, ethnicity also exhibited a substantial (albeit smaller) independent impact on civic attitudes. Thus, while SES is a better predictor of civic attitudes among hispanics than ethnicity, SES in no way renders "spurious" the relationship between ethnicity and civic attitudes.

Interpreting the effects of "length of residence" is a much more difficult task. One major complicating factor is the high inter-correlation between ethnicity and length of residence ($R=.52$). Inter-correlations of this magnitude between independent variables complicates the process of sorting out unique and common variances explained by the independent variables. Despite the large percentage of non-unique (or common) variance attributable to both independent variables jointly, the commonality analysis for ethnicity versus length of residence provides us with some rather revealing and interesting findings. Table 2C reports the results:

TABLE 2C. Commonality Analysis: Unique and Common Variances in Civic Political Attitudes Explained by Ethnicity and Length of New York City Residence (N=189)

Variable	Ethnicity			L. of Residence		
	Zero-Order R^2	Unique R^2	Common Variance (R^2)	Zero-Order R^2	Unique R^2	Total R^2
PINVOLVE	.100	.055	.066	.121	.035	.155
CVCAWARE	.046	.005	.041	.088	.047	.094
PEFFICACY	.061	.032	.029	.048	.020	.080
PCYNICISM	.087	.012	.075	.163	.087	.174
CPATTS	.123	.022	.101	.207	.107	.230

Table 2C reveals much about the effects of length of residence on the civic political attitudes of hispanic groups. First, data in the table raise serious doubts about the effects of ethnicity on community political awareness (CVCAWARE) and political cynicism (PCYNICISM). It is perhaps not surprising that length of residence should have a strong impact on community awareness. Certainly, hispanics who have lived in New York the longest are most likely to have knowledge of neighborhood political activities. Cognition is an important aspect of any "awareness" attitude by definition, and learning processes can only take place over time. It is worth noting, however, that low levels of community political awareness do not appear to represent a deeper predisposition among hispanics to avoid community involvement. Based on the data in Table 2C, then, I conclude that differences in community political awareness between hispanic groups are negligible when length of New York City residence is held constant.

The effects of length of residence on the relationship between ethnicity and political cynicism are, to say the least, surprising. In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba maintain that "trust in government" is a deep-rooted dimension of political culture. If this is true, political cynicism should be somewhat impervious to the effects of demographic factors like length of residence. However, at least among hispanic groups in the sample, longer residence leads to greater political cynicism and tends to eliminate attitudinal differences between hispanic ethnic groups. One possible explanation for this effect seems intriguing: the longer one resides in the same locale, the greater the likelihood of contact with local government; given the level of ethnic segmentation in New York, it is possible that the greater one's exposure to local government officials, the greater the level of political cynicism. In a previous research paper based on data from the Ethnic Block Survey, I discovered that political cynicism (and not trust) was correlated with participation in politics. Although the causal direction between cynicism and participation is unclear

(i.e., does political cynicism lead to greater participation, or does participation lead to greater cynicism?), it appears that longer residency may inadvertently lead to higher levels of political participation through its influence on political cynicism.

The commonality analysis reported in Table 2C also tends to confirm the independent impact of ethnicity on psychological involvement in politics and sense of political efficacy. In both cases, ethnicity proves to be a better predictor than length of residence. Clearly the data do not suggest that controlling for length of residence renders the relationship spurious. Psychological involvement in politics and personal political efficacy may well be attitudes that are fundamental to one's world political view. As a result, differences between hispanic groups may be a function of historical factors and the political socialization process which transmits historical features of political culture from one generation to the next.

Although I did not predict differences in levels of political efficacy between hispanic groups, I did "hypothesize" that Puerto Ricans would exhibit the highest levels of psychological involvement in politics. I further argued that assimilation was an unlikely source of hispanic differences in psychological involvement. Using length of residence as a surrogate for assimilation, it appears that ^{higher} assimilation levels among Puerto Ricans do not account for their distinctiveness on this attitude. (In a preliminary data analysis, I also discovered that a greater knowledge of English among Puerto Ricans did not account for differences in psychological involvement between hispanic groups.) Thus, Puerto Ricans continue to exhibit higher levels of psychological involvement in politics, even when socioeconomic status and demographic variables are held constant.

Because our initial findings did not indicate common hispanic patterns among civic political attitudes, it is unnecessary to compare hispanics, blacks and white ethnics

for these variables. Instead, we will proceed to an examination of bureaucratic political attitudes.

Bureaucratic Political Attitudes

Ethnic political consciousness and civic political attitudes predispose people to actively participate in politics. Contacting public officials for help with community problems, joining community problem-solving organizations, signing community improvement petitions, working in campaigns, voting, and joining protest demonstrations are all common forms of local political participation. In this section of the paper I will examine political attitudes that may predispose people to (or inhibit them from) contacting government agencies for personal or subsistence purposes. Eight specific attitudes will be examined, representing three kinds of bureaucratic attitudes: propensity to seek government subsistence aid, perceptions of the "self" as an effective bureaucratic actor, and beliefs about the fairness and impartiality of bureaucratic officials.

The propensity to seek government subsistence aid is measured by a single variable (SEEKGOVT), and is based on the following survey question: "Now, here's a financial problem I'd like to get your opinion about...Suppose a family is flat broke, with no money at all. Neither the man nor the woman can find a job. And there are children to support. Who should this family ask for financial help--relatives, friends, the welfare department, or whom?" Respondents who answered the "welfare department" or other government agencies were coded "1"; all other responses were coded "0".

Perception of the "self" as an effective bureaucratic actor is measured by three separate questions all prefaced by the following remarks: "Let's say you yourself had to go to an office of the city government about a problem you needed help with. " : a)FEELGOOD--"On the way to this city office, how do you think you would feel? Would you be mostly nervous, at ease, angry, not too concerned about

it, or worried about how you would be treated?"; b)DEMAND--"How would you deal with the people in this office to get them to do something about your problems? Would you firmly insist on your rights, simply ask for help, or get angry and tell them off?"; and c)WRITECALL--"How would you most likely contact this office? Would you call them on the telephone, write them a letter, or go there in person?" All three of the resultant variables were dichotomized into "0" and "1" categories. Respondents were coded "1" if they would feel at ease before contacting the office, if they would insist on their rights or get angry with government officials, and if they would either write or call versus make a personal visit to the office.

"Beliefs about the fairness and impartiality of bureaucratic officials" are measured by four different questions. All four questions were prefaced by the general remarks stated above: a)GETHELP--"...How likely is it that they would help you with your problem: very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?"; b)TREATWELL--"How do you think the people at that office would treat you? Would they probably treat you like just another number, give you personal attention, or would they give you the run around?"; c)EQUALTRTMNT--"Do you think you would be treated better in some offices of the city government than others?"; and d)EFFICIENCY--"How about what makes a city government office a bad one to go to? Would you say that the most important thing is that they don't pay attention to people, there is unnecessary delay in handling things, or that the people working at the office are unpleasant?" GETHELP was coded from "1" to "3" (least to most likely to receive help); the other three variables were dichotomized into "0" and "1" categories. If the respondent expected personal treatment, equal treatment from different government offices, and was most concerned with "unnecessary delay", he or she was coded "1".

Table 3A reports the mean scores, eta, and t-test information for all three hispanic groups on bureaucratic political attitudes. The statistical significance of eta is also reported:

TABLE 3A. Bureaucratic Political Attitudes:
Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans
(N=189)

Variable (min/max)	$\bar{X}$ Scores				T-Tests-sig. levels		
	Cub	Dom	PR	Eta	Cub/Dom	Cub/PR	Dom/PR
SEEKGOVT (0/1)	.78	.87	.82	.10	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
FEELGOOD (0/1)	.38	.20	.42	.20*	.05	n.s.	.05
DEMAND (0/1)	.33	.36	.46	.11	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
WRITECALL (0/1)	.14	.16	.26	.13	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
GETHELP (1/3)	2.21	2.18	2.00	.13	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
TREATWELL (0/1)	.60	.54	.30	.25**	n.s.	.01	.05
EQUALTRTMNT (0/1)	.41	.54	.56	.14	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
EFFICIENCY (0/1)	.18	.31	.32	.15	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

*P-statistic is statistically significant at the .05 level

**P-statistic is statistically significant at the .01 level

The findings reported in Table 3A are clear-cut and easily interpretable. On six of the eight bureaucratic attitudes, there are no statistically significant differences in mean scores between any pair of hispanic groups. For FEELGOOD, there are significant differences between Dominicans and the other two groups. Specifically, Dominicans are most likely to express concern about contacting a government office. There are, of course, various possible reasons for Dominican concern: lack of mastery of the English language, unfamiliarity with U.S. government procedures, fear of maltreatment. It is also possible that the illegal status of many Dominicans is a major source of their concern. Government to them could be indistinguishable from the sometimes dreaded immigration official. However, I have serious doubts about the "illegal immigrant" thesis in this case. In the study

sample, Dominicans are as likely as Cubans to seek personal services from city government offices (17.9% for Cubans, 16.4% for Dominicans), and Dominicans^{in the sample} are actually more likely to seek subsistence aid than either Cubans or Puerto Ricans (39.3% for Dominicans, 34.6% for Cubans, and 22.0% for Puerto Ricans).

Puerto Ricans exhibit statistically significant mean differences with Cubans and Dominicans on the issue of expected treatment in government offices. Specifically, Puerto Ricans are most likely to believe that government officials would not treat them well. Given the fairly strong correlations between TREATWELL and several political cynicism and "negative" ethnic political consciousness items, it seems likely that we are observing simply another manifestation of a more general skeptical attitude many Puerto Ricans have toward local government.

The four control variables used **earlier** were also introduced into the analysis to test for possibly spurious **relationships** between ethnicity, on the one hand, and FEELGOOD and TREATWELL, on the other. Multiple Classification Analysis was again used to explore the impact of SES and other demographic variables. The results of MCA support the notion that inter-hispanic differences on these two variables are "real." Dominicans continue to express greater concern about approaching government offices when control variables are introduced, and Puerto Ricans continue to express greater **skepticism** about receiving fair treatment from government offices.

Given that hispanic groups are not distinguishable on most bureaucratic political attitudes, we can focus our attention on the possibility that "hispanics" as a group will exhibit distinctive bureaucratic attitudes vis-a-vis blacks and white ethnics. Table 3B reports mean scores for hispanics, blacks and white ethnics. The statistical significance of t-tests performed is also reported, along with *etas* and their corresponding levels of statistical significance:

TABLE 3B. Bureaucratic Political Attitudes:
Hispanics, Blacks and White Ethnics (N=189)

Variable	$\bar{X}$ Scores			Eta	T-Tests-sig. levels		
	Hisp	Black	Wh.Ethnics		H/B	H/W	B/W
SEEKGOVT	.82	.83	.65	.20**	n.s.	.01	.01
DEMAND	.37	.62	.43	.17**	.01	n.s.	.05
WRITECALL	.18	.30	.59	.39***	n.s.	.001	.001
GETHELP	2.14	1.95	2.06	.10	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
EQUALTRTMNT	.49	.49	.53	.03	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
EFFICIENCY	.26	.40	.63	.34***	n.s.	.001	.01

**F-Statistic is significant at the .01 level

***F-Statistic is significant at the .001 level

With regard to a distinctive pattern of hispanic bureaucratic political attitudes, the results in Table 3B are mixed. There are no statistically significant differences between the three ethnic categories in their expectation of receiving help from a government office, nor are there differences in the belief that some city offices treat one better than do other city offices (i.e., GETHELP and EQUALTRTMNT). Hispanics and blacks exhibit statistically significant mean differences only for DEMAND. Blacks are considerably more likely than hispanics to say that they would "firmly insist on their rights" or "get angry." However, hispanics and white ethnics do not differ in their hypothetical approaches to government officials.

Hispanics differ from white ethnics on three variables: SEEKGOVT, WRITECALL, and EFFICIENCY. Thus, hispanics are much more likely than white ethnics to seek public versus private subsistence support, to say that they would approach government offices "in person", rather than through impersonal channels. Hispanics are also more likely than white ethnics to value "personal attention" over "efficiency"

in government offices. Although the differences are not statistically significant, hispanics differ from blacks in the same manner as they differ from white ethnics on WHITECALL and EFFICIENCY. I would suggest that cultural factors are "at work" in distinguishing hispanics from white ethnics and blacks on these variables.

Personalismo, the high value placed on personal "face to face" relations compared to impersonal and physically distant social interaction in hispanic culture, appears to be surfacing here.

It is doubtful that differences between hispanics and white ethnics on SEEKGOVT express a distinctively hispanic cultural value. For one thing, blacks are as likely to express the need for government financial aid versus seeking private help. The reasons seem rather obvious. Working and under-class people have little recourse but to seek government help in times of severe financial distress. I would contend that black and hispanic propensity to select government over private sources of financial aid is simply a reflection of the reality of lower-class life.

To summarize the findings on bureaucratic political attitudes: hispanic groups were not differentiated on most variables measuring bureaucratic political attitudes. Differences were encountered on the issue of how people might feel before contacting a bureaucratic agency, and on expectations of receiving good or bad treatment from government officials. Dominicans were most concerned (emotionally) about approaching a government office, and Puerto Ricans were most likely to expect poor treatment from a government office. On the six variables for which there was little or no difference between hispanic groups, two proved to represent distinctive hispanic attitudinal patterns. It was suggested that both variables reflect the high value placed on personal, face-to-face contacts in hispanic culture. Hispanics were also shown to distinguish themselves from white ethnics on the propensity to seek government financial aid. However, it was suggested that seeking financial aid from government is more likely a function of working and lower class life than an ethnic factor per se.

CONCLUSION

Most of the predictions made in the introduction were well-supported by the data. Puerto Ricans exhibited the highest levels of ethnic political consciousness, although I anticipated greater differences than were discovered. The fact that length of New York residence did not eliminate differences between Puerto Ricans and other hispanics supports the plausibility of my **thesis** that high ethnic political consciousness among Puerto Ricans is largely **a group-level phenomenon--** i.e., the result of greater involvement of Puerto Ricans as a group in the various social movements of the 1960's. One of the surprising findings of the data analysis, however, was the propensity for Dominicans to express higher levels of ethnic political consciousness than Cubans. Although we state no expectations about Dominican-Cuban differences in ethnic consciousness, the findings beg interpretation that is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present study.

The findings on civic political attitudes lend particularly strong support **to our thesis that Puerto Ricans would exhibit the highest levels of** psychological involvement in politics, but would not be distinguishable from Cubans and Dominicans on variables measuring community political awareness or political cynicism. Initial findings appeared to uncover higher levels of both cynicism and community awareness among Puerto Ricans. However, when length of New York City residence was held constant, differences between Puerto Ricans and other hispanics all but disappeared on these variables.

A strong prima facie case has been made for the role of historical factors unique to the Puerto Rican experience as sources of political-attitudinal differences between Puerto Ricans and other hispanics. Neither greater English proficiency nor length of New York residence eliminated differences in psychological involvement in politics between Puerto Ricans and the two other hispanic groups. While these findings do not "prove" our thesis correct, neither was the alternative

"assimilation thesis" confirmed in the analysis. Our inability to measure "historical" variables in the statistical analysis prevented any direct confirmation of the historical thesis. However, the thesis could have been disconfirmed by demonstrating that Puerto Ricans did not exhibit higher levels of psychological involvement in politics, or by demonstrating that such high levels were merely the result of assimilation or socio-economic factors. Neither of these alternatives was demonstrated, so the historical thesis remains plausible.

The examination of bureaucratic political attitudes also tended to confirm our earlier expectation that few if any differences would be found in bureaucratic attitudes among hispanic groups. A further comparison of hispanics with blacks and white ethnics did little to identify a distinctive hispanic bureaucratic pattern. On six of the eight bureaucratic attitudes, hispanics proved to be little differentiated from blacks and white ethnics. However, the comparison between hispanics and other groups did reveal a distinctive hispanic pattern in two variables thought to reflect the deep-rooted hispanic value for personal, face-to-face relationships.

This leads us ^{to} the more general purpose of the study. Our goal was to evaluate the utility of the concept of "hispanic political behavior" as a description of a set of political attitudes. With few exceptions, the term "hispanic political attitudes" was of little conceptual help in describing the attitudes analyzed. Puerto Ricans exhibited strong attitudinal differences from other hispanics on two of the three types of attitudes analyzed. Dominicans proved to be distinguishable from Cubans on several items measuring ethnic political consciousness. Cubans, on the other hand, ~~tended~~ to exhibit higher levels of civic political attitudes than Dominicans. All in all, the conceptual utility of "hispanic" as a descriptive term was limited.

While political attitudes may vary greatly from hispanic group to hispanic group, other dimensions of political behavior may be more uniform among hispanics.

It is entirely possible that patterns of voting behavior and political participation in general may be more uniform among hispanics than attitudes have proven to be. Other similar patterns are also possible.

The findings of this study also raise interesting questions about possible comparisons with Chicanos. Are the political attitudes of Chicanos basically similar to those of Cubans, Dominicans or Puerto Ricans? Or do Chicanos represent yet a fourth attitudinal pattern among major hispanic groups? These and other questions of a comparative nature about the hispanic political **experience** await further study.